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This chapter extrapolates from Turkey’s engagement in intervention
issues to generate an enhanced understanding of rising powers’—and
Brazil’s—actions in this area. The new political elite in Turkey has
fundamentally altered Turkish foreign policy since the Adalet ve Kalk-
ınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party—AKP) came to power in
2002. While the traditional foreign policy ensured the continuation of
the status quo defined by alliance with the “West” under the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s collective security umbrella,
the new foreign policy is proactive and fluid. As Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu has often publicly declared, Turkey is playing a new game
where it seeks to shift its status in the current international system by
increasing its “soft power”1 to move from the periphery to the center.
The AKP administration ultimately views power as a tool for carrying
out policy objectives in a very dangerous geopolitical environment: the
Middle East. Whereas previous governments depended on the United
States and other Western allies, the AKP policy focuses on climbing up
the ladder of the international hierarchy and rising from peripheral
status to that of a rising middle or even great power in the system.
In other words, Turkey is attempting to reimagine and reassert its
role and power in the current international system. This chapter out-
lines how international peacekeeping has played an instrumental role
in Turkey’s use of power politics to enhance its position vis-à-vis other
states. To do so, I examine the nature of Turkey’s role in interna-
tional interventions and peacekeeping, as well as its normative stance
in global governance and how it responds to changing norms of
international interventions such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
An examination of Turkey’s path from periphery to center reveals
that it is by no means unique and indeed serves as a fruitful theory-
building case for the elaboration of conclusions regarding other rising
powers, including but clearly not limited to Brazil. This chapter argues
that middle powers that have the capability and willingness to trans-
form into rising powers use peace operations and intervention as
instruments of bringing their “soft” and “hard” power to bear. The
Turkish case is used to build a theoretical understanding of how and
why rising powers act in the international system to enhance their
status. Moreover, the insights gathered from the case are used to infer
how Brazil might utilize its soft and hard power instrumentally. The
implications of the chapter are important for Brazil, as well as other
rising middle powers, to show that seemingly altruistic missions such as
blue helmet operations can be instruments of power used to challenge
the existing global distribution of power.
Rising powers, norms, and peacekeeping: the Turkish case
From the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of
the new Republic in 1923 until the mid-1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy
was Western- and status quo-oriented and risk-averse. This policy
was gradually transformed in the 1990s—mostly because of Turkey’s
renewed interest in European Union (EU) membership, resulting in its
candidacy in 1999. Moreover, the post-Cold War environment and
regional developments, particularly conflict in the Balkans, raised
public support for a more proactive policy.
Despite the conventional wisdom that Turkey’s proactive foreign
policy dates back only to the last decade, the Turkish political elite has
been struggling to refurbish Turkish foreign policy since the end of the
Cold War. In fact, in a parliamentary speech in 1992, Hikmet Çetin,
Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 1994, positioned Turkey “at a
crossroads, meeting point of a key region, Atlantic, Europe, Eurasia
region, that with the help of scientific, technological and economic
potential would turn into a locomotive of global peace and welfare.”2
His successor, I
.
smail Cem, who held office between 1997 and 2002,
was even more determined in his claim to bring Turkey into the new
millennium as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Cem’s book Turkey
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in the New Century shows this keen effort to shift Turkey’s static for-
eign policymaking into a more active role by underscoring Turkey’s
leadership potential in its immediate region.3 Nevertheless, the coun-
try’s political and economic instability in the 1990s prevented the for-
eign policy elite from pushing this new objective further. Turkey
experienced unstable coalition governments, strong military tutelage,
and a cycle of devastating economic crises, which finally resulted in the
notorious watershed for the Turkish economy in 2001. Overall, poli-
tical and economic limitations, with which Brazil also struggled for
decades, curbed the Turkish political elite’s aspirations to become a
regional if not a global player until the 2000s.
The uneasy left-center-right/ultranationalist three-party coalition
government, established after the 1999 elections, started picking up the
pieces of the economic ruins, as the International Monetary Fund
stepped in with the strictest economic policies of the Turkish Repub-
lican era. Not surprisingly, shortly thereafter, the government was
voted out and the AKP came to power in the November 2002 general
elections. Since then the new Islamist/liberal/conservative coalition—
the political elite that was amalgamated in the AKP—has fundamen-
tally altered Turkish foreign policy. While traditional Turkish foreign
policy ensured the continuation of the status quo, defined by allying
with the West within NATO’s collective security umbrella, the new
foreign policy has become progressively proactive under the academic/
politician and former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. This time around, a thriving economy
assisted Davutoğlu and the government not only in defining aspiring
objectives but also in implementing them. With a leadership ready to
change the status quo in foreign policymaking, Turkey at last obtained
the means to claim its rising power status, similar to the path followed
by other rising powers such as Brazil.
The AKP government views power as the ultimate tool to accom-
plish policy objectives in “a very dangerous geopolitical environment”
in reference to the Middle East. Portrayal of Turkey’s geopolitical
situation as dangerous is not new. However, whereas previous admin-
istrations followed a security-based, risk averse policy, this chapter
argues that the AKP policy focuses on climbing the up the ladder of
international hierarchy and rising from a weak/middle power to rising
middle/great power status in the system. Consequently, the present text
builds on the literature that argues that Turkey is attempting to reim-
agine and reassert its role and power in the current international
system through discourse and action.4 This policy choice is not coin-
cidental, but rather the result of rational policy calculations. In other
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words, rising power politics pay—and like Brazil, Turkey strategizes its
foreign policy for that payoff.
Several instruments are available to rising powers to participate, and
enforce their terms, in the system. Establishing and strengthening
bilateral political and economic relations with advanced and develop-
ing countries is one such instrument. However, a rather effective means
for rising powers to pursue their policy agendas is through interna-
tional organizations and their conflict resolution mechanisms. As
Joseph Nye aptly puts it, “[n]onetheless, for all its flaws, the United
Nations (UN) has proved useful in its humanitarian and peacekeeping
roles where states agree, and it remains an important source of legit-
imization in world politics.”5 As do most major powers, rising powers
seek legitimization through international organizations such as the
UN. In a world where conflict has changed form but not necessarily
ceased, combining hard and soft power to pursue national interests has
become a viable strategy. In fact, Nye argues that not using soft power
to balance one’s hard power can be expensive, as in the case of the
United State’s decision to launch the Iraq War of 2003 without an
applicable Security Council resolution.6
In the case of Turkey, the political elite’s intention to use the coun-
try’s soft and hard power to renegotiate its rising role in the Western
and non-Western world conferred an instrumental role upon interna-
tional organizations and multilateral interventions. In this sense, Tur-
key’s contributions to multilateral interventions have been strategically
used to augment the country’s political and economic influence in its
periphery: the Balkans, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Africa.7 Turkey
has also signaled to the EU that it does not need its membership to
expand its economy.
The signal sent through interventions particularly in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and the Balkans is that the EU needs Turkey for its own economy
and security more than Turkey needs the EU for its economy.8 The next
section examines the changing nature of Turkey’s role in peace opera-
tions and how international interventions are used to pursue the
country’s national interests and enhance its rising power status.
The changing nature of Turkey’s role
in international peacekeeping
After the Korean War, in which it deployed 15,000 troops and lost 733
lives, Turkey refrained from participating in international interventions
until the end of the Cold War.9 In the 1990s, the political elite deemed
Turkey’s contributions to the EU, NATO, and the Conference (later
130 Nil Seda Satana
Organization) for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE)
missions in the Balkans and the Caucasus necessary to highlight Tur-
key’s normative and security commitment to the West. At a time when
Turkey was struggling to secure EU membership, these missions were a
way to show where Turkey’s loyalties lay and how useful it could be for
the West. To a lesser degree, Turkey took part in UN operations
such as the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II in Somalia for
the same reason; here a Turkish general officer became the Force
Commander.
Turkey’s intervention policy became clearer in the 2000s. A concept
document on Turkey’s Contribution to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
Operations, which was signed by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan on 15 March 2005, has shaped Turkey’s peacekeeping and
peacebuilding policy over the past decade. The first principle in the docu-
ment is the requirement of international legitimacy of the peacekeeping
operation for which troops are requested. This means the mission
must be mandated by a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution.
Second, missions to certain regions such as the Balkans, Central
Asia, and the Middle East are prioritized over others in the policy
document.10 Third, certain international organizations were deemed
more important than others: NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE,
respectively. In recent years, as Turkey’s bid for the EU membership
weakened, the UN has replaced the EU in terms of priority. Finally,
the policy document highlights the importance of clear mission objec-
tives so that the costs and benefits of contributing to the mission can
be assessed in the parliament before voting takes place. Turkey’s major
principle has been to avoid zones of open conflict, and probably for
this reason, its police contributions to peace operations have always
been higher than its military contributions.
The most recent interventions to which Turkey has contributed
heavily in its periphery, such as the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, show that the country is now more willing to get involved
in peace operations than it has been in the past. The UN has become
part of Turkey’s new multidimensional foreign policy as Turkey’s past
goal of maintaining its Western alliances has evolved into emerging as
a regional power and a global player in the international system. The
UN is now perceived as a “world” organization as opposed to just
another “Western” institution such as NATO or the EU.
Moreover, Turkey’s definition of periphery has also been changing
and broadening. Turkey funded and served in several UN peace
operations in Africa, including in Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Burundi,
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Congo, Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire—11 missions in total as of writing.
However, Turkey’s military troop contributions have been mostly sym-
bolic in these missions, whereas in 2004 it “ranked third after Jordan
and the United States in providing police officers to peace opera-
tions.”11 Nevertheless, Turkey has been the rising power least willing to
deploy personnel to multilateral peace operations over the period from
2002 to 2011, compared with Brazil, Indonesia, or South Africa.12 In
sum, although there has been an increase in Turkey’s contributions to
peace operations in the world from the 1990s to the 2000s and beyond,
it has not yet caught up with other rising powers. Still, Turkey is
accepted as an important actor by Western powers in international
peacekeeping, especially for missions in the Middle East and Africa,
because of its rising popularity in its periphery. Consequently, the
governing Turkish political elite perceives peace operations in the
Middle East and Africa instrumentally, as means to increase Turkey’s
power and prestige in the international system.
For example, in February 2013, the High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine
Ashton, requested assistance for the EU mission in the Central African
Republic (CAR) mission from Turkey. Davutoğlu and Ashton’s phone
call was reflected to the Turkish media as a sign of how Turkey is
highly sought as a contributor to peace operations. Davutoğlu was said
to explain to Ashton how Turkey is very active in African peace-
keeping and peacebuilding efforts, for example training the Gambian
police forces. Moreover, Davutoğlu highlighted the massacres carried
out against Muslims in the CAR and promised to support operations
against these massacres. While the government denied any request of
military assistance by Ashton, it promised to consult the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces General Staff, the national intelli-
gence agency (MIT), and the Turkish Cooperation and Development
Agency (TIKA) before taking any action. Deploying troops would also
require parliamentary approval.
A week before his telephone conversation with Ashton, Davutoğlu
used the CAR issue in an EU Political Dialogue meeting in Brussels to
show his counterparts how he had already discussed with the African
Union and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) an action
plan, which included setting up an observer mission, a meeting of for-
eign ministers, and eventually the appointment of a special repre-
sentative. As Davutoğlu highlighted the details of his conversation with
OIC General Secretary Iyad Medeni, it was clear that he wanted to tell
the EU ministers that the region could handle its own problems, and
Turkey would lead these local efforts. Interestingly, however, while the
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EU representatives in Brussels requested troops from the Turkish,
American, Canadian, Georgian, Norwegian, and Serbian militaries for
a mission under French General Philippe Ponties, Davutoğlu insisted
that the Turkish foreign ministry had been asked only for general
assistance, but not troops.13 It was not until after UN Secretary Gen-
eral Ban Ki-Moon’s phone call to Erdoğan, and deliberations in the
government, that Turkey decided to deploy troops and an aircraft to
the CAR mission.14
In sum, the nature of Turkey’s contributions to international inter-
ventions, and particularly peace operations, has changed from passive
to active, as its foreign policy has changed from weak middle power to
rising middle power politics. Multilateralism has developed into the
main principle in Turkey’s foreign policy, and peace operations have
become a significant part of multilateralism for the Turkish policy
making elite, as was the case for Brazilian decision makers. The next
section will elaborate on how this change took place, and whether
Turkey’s normative responses to peacekeeping aligns with other rising
powers’ normative and behavioral standards.
Turkey’s normative responses to intervention
Although Turkey has always been committed to Western international
organizations such as NATO as part of both of its strategic alliance
with the United States and its overarching security concerns, it has been less
interested in other international organizations. Current Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Tayyip Erdoğan’s foreign policy advisor since 2002
and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009–2014, renewed Turkey’s inter-
est in multilateralism and international organizations such as the UN
in the last decade. In fact, Turkey is officially claimed to be
emerging as a center for international organizations in recent
years, including the U.N. Turkey currently hosts the U.N. Popula-
tion and Development Fund’s regional office, Secretariat [for]
Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the Turkish Cooperation
Council.15
Turkey has mostly complied with the norms in these and other inter-
national organizations and, as will be explained, has been eager to take
on a more active role in the UN Security Council as a non-permanent
member. The renewed interest in the UN is largely a part of Turkey’s
foreign policy goal of emerging first as a regional, subsequently as a
global power in world affairs, as clearly defined by Davutoğlu in
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several of his writings and speeches. In his 2010 book Strategic Depth,
Davutoğlu uses an analogy of a “bow and arrow” where he argues that
the more Turkey’s bow extends backwards to Asia, the further its arrow
will advance into Europe.16 Hence, from Davutoğlu’s perspective,
becoming a regional power or a central country depends on first strength-
ening ties to the periphery, that is to say, theMiddle East.17 The concepts
of center and periphery—and the objective of moving from the per-
iphery to the center—are often highlighted in Davutoğlu’s writings.18
He understands and acknowledges that bilateral relations cannot move
a state from the periphery to the center, whereas multilateralism can.
Davutoğlu emphasizes the significance of developing “the instruments
in dealing with existing multilateralism”, as “the interdependence
paradigm puts a special importance on three channels, which are highly
relevant in Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism: multiple channels of
communications, an absence of hierarchy among the issues (the
rejection of the high politics vs. low politics dichotomy), and a
diminished role for military power.”19 Thus, Davutoğlu stresses
international organizations’ overall importance for Turkey and its soft
power.
Turkey and rising powers’ soft power
What constitutes rising powers’ soft power? In particular, how do rising
countries such as Turkey and Brazil pursue rising power politics using
multilateralism? As Turkey began to maneuver to be a global player
using its soft power, it became more interested in regional multilateral
policies, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and more
recently Syria. Officially, Turkey’s aims in the region can be summar-
ized as “achieving peace, security, stability and prosperity in its region
and beyond through cooperation based on political dialogue, economic
interdependence and cultural harmony.”20 In practice, Turkey, similar
to other rising powers such as Brazil, has tried to achieve these
goals through soft power, by capitalizing on three major strategies:
humanitarian and development aid, mediation, and peace operations.
First, Turkey has complied with central countries’ normative beha-
vior of extending humanitarian aid to developing countries, especially
in Africa. In 2011, Sinan Ulgen from Carnegie Europe explained that
“the official aid budget for Turkey is around 1.5 billion [US] dollars
and it gives aid to about 98 different countries around the world. So in
many ways there is a new assertiveness, a new visibility, and a growing
regional footprint in Turkish diplomacy.” In 2013, the Zaman news-
paper, which was a loyal supporter of the AKP at the time, further
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argued, “Turkish intellectuals, TV shows, aid organizations and the
Hizmet movement have become important components of the coun-
try’s soft power, whether they aim for it or not.”21 Brazil followed a
similar strategy and over the last decade, more than half of its huma-
nitarian assistance has gone to sub-Saharan Africa, particularly to
Somalia and Haiti.22
Second, Turkey tried very hard to take on a mediator role between
Syria and Israel, different factions in Lebanon, and Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and to contribute to the Middle East peace process through
its religious affinity with Palestinians—although these attempts failed
when relations with Israel declined during the Mavi Marmara flotilla
incident. The Turkish political elite used Turkey’s Muslim and secular
identity to argue that it can be amodel and a neutral mediator to solve the
region’s issues. Brazil followed a similar strategy in its immediate periphery
(South America) and elsewhere (Africa and the Middle East), trying to
portray itself as a neutral third party and a rising power to soft-balance
conflicts between several parties.23 Moreover, in May 2010, Turkey and
Brazil attempted to negotiate a deal between the “P5+1” states and
Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.24 Although this mediation
attempt failed, Turkey and Brazil’s efforts to work within the current
normative framework of the West persisted.
Finally, as previously stated, Turkey’s contributions to peace opera-
tions increased in the 2000s, despite falling short of what other rising
powers contribute to peacekeeping. Nevertheless, Turkey’s normative
approach to humanitarian interventions and peace operations mostly
remained in line with the existing framework established by advanced
countries, akin to many other rising powers including Brazil. Çetin
argues that while Turkey respects the sovereignty of other states, as a
signatory to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights and a party
to the European Court of Human Rights, it cannot “remain irrespon-
sive to genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing.”25
In that vein, Turkey aligns with the EU on R2P and the protection
of civilians (PoC).26 In fact, it has called on the UN to intervene in the
Syrian conflict, and Ahmet Davutoğlu harshly criticized the UNSC
deadlock resulting in non-intervention in Syria.27 For example, in his
speech to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2012, Davutoğlu
strongly urged the UN to act on the conflicts in Syria and Palestine,
and accused the international community of not trying hard enough to
build peace and security in developing countries.28 Although Turkish
policy on interventions has been mostly pragmatic and its foreign
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policy has strictly followed the non-intervention norm in the past,
Cenap Cakmak argues that “in the Syrian crisis, Turkish foreign policy
has been overwhelmingly normative.”29
The AKP government discursively used the R2P principle to build a
coalition of more than 90 countries to support the Friends of Syria
opposition against the Assad regime and to call for the UN Security
Council to fulfill its PoC duties by intervening in the Syrian conflict.30
Interestingly, Brazil was reluctant to join Turkey’s efforts for Syria, and
offered instead the “responsibility while protecting” concept; however,
the concept did not get much initial support from Turkey or advanced
powers.31
As another example of compliance with norms of global governance,
Turkey initially objected to intervention in Libya, as it was concerned
that France would act unilaterally in this intervention. Once the mis-
sion was mandated by the UNSC and supported by the Arab League,
and after NATO asked Turkey to deploy troops, the AKP government
agreed to the Libya mission.32 Brazil, on the other hand, abstained on
UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorized intervention in Libya, and it
has not been responsive to many other calls for contributions to
intervention.33
Following in Brazil’s footsteps, in recent years Turkey has begun to
criticize harshly the practice of the norms instilled by theWestern powers.
For instance, in the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly on 24
July 2009, Ambassador Fazli Corman warned the body that many
states had begun to perceive the R2P as a new form of colonialism,
and that the principle needed to be defined and implemented carefully.34
Furthermore, while Davutoğlu’s discourse points to using peace
operations in Africa for leverage and power enhancement in the inter-
national system, Erdoğan’s discourse adds to the harsh critique of the
West. His chief former policy advisor of many years, former academic
Ibrahim Kalın, points to Erdoğan’s denunciation of the West as
exploiters of African riches in his speech at the Gabonese Parliament
on 6 January 2013:
Erdoğan criticized Africa’s Western colonizers and said Turkey is
not one of the countries that sees diamonds and gold when it looks
at the impoverished continent … The prime minister said those
who exploited Africa’s natural riches and even its population in
the form of slavery will sooner or later be held accountable for
what they did.35
More interestingly, Erdoğan stated that
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[t]here is a very meaningful saying here in Africa that when the
flood comes, fish eat the ants and when the flood recedes, ants eat
the fish. No one should rely on their current might and superiority
because who eats whom depends on the flow of water.36
Erdoğan’s accusations to the former colonizers are perhaps subtle;
however, his bringing up the subject of “the legacy of the Ottoman
Empire, which was the symbol of peaceful coexistence in Africa for
centuries” is rather crafty. The AKP’s discourse on multiculturalism
and the Ottoman Empire is often used to show African states that
Turkey is nothing like the imperialist colonizers:
The Ottoman Empire never acted on imperialist ambitions. It
rejected outright imperialism. It never interfered with the language,
beliefs, culture or lifestyle of any country and it never was like
those who exploited the riches of other countries.37
The AKP elite suggests that an empire of 600 years that extended from
the Middle East to Africa and Europe was not imperialist while the
West still is; hence the Turkish presence in Africa through peace
operations and development aid should be more desirable than that of
its Western peers. Finally, Turkey challenged norms at least in one
instance. During a UN debate on peacekeeping, Russia and Turkey
pled for “socio-economic issues to be early peacebuilding tasks,
despite disagreement on whether a peacekeeping mission is the most
appropriate instrument to achieve these goals.”38
Turkey’s criticism of global governance has mostly been on the
practice of peace operations, thus this example of challenging estab-
lished norms on how socioeconomic issues in a country should be
handled is a rare example of Turkey’s attempt at norm revision.
Moreover, while the Turkish elite discursively challenges the West and
its norms at times, no action has been taken to actually challenge
the implementation of the norms of global governance. Thus, the dis-
course seems to be used to affect the public opinion of the periphery,
that is African and Middle Eastern nations, as well as the domestic
constituency in Turkey.
In sum, all of these proactive regional policies, and the use of soft
power, contributed to Turkey’s pursuing a non-permanent seat in the
UNSC, after 47 years of absence, in 2009–2010. Brazil also pursued a
seat during the 2010–2011 term of the UN Security Council using
similar strategies and cooperation with other rising powers in inter-
national alliances such as IBSA (India‑Brazil‑South Africa) and
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BRICS (Brazil‑Russia‑India‑China‑South Africa).39 Clearly, interna-
tional organizations such as the UN have become strategic tools for
middle powers to fulfill regional and global aspirations with the ulti-
mate goal of rising in the hierarchy of states in the international system
and enhancing national interests.
The path from the periphery to the center: rising middle power
politics, norms, and peacekeeping
As portrayed thus far, the Turkish case is not unique. The Turkish
foreign policy elite strategizes the country’s foreign policy and particu-
larly peacekeeping policy in the same manner as Brazil or any other
rising middle power does. A strand in the literature approaches the
foreign policy behaviors of countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and South
Africa among others in the framework of “new” or “emerging” or
“rising” middle powers.40 The necessity to distinguish between tradi-
tional middle powers and new middle powers stems from the structural
and behavioral differences between the countries that can be included
in these two categories. Canada, Turkey, Norway, and Brazil cannot be
conceptually analyzed within the same middle power category, after
all. Then how are rising middle powers different from traditional
middle powers?
Eduard Jordaan summarizes the characteristics of middle powers
using liberal, realist, and critical theoretical literatures as “[l]iberals (such
as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal) emphasize agency in middle-power
foreign policy, realists (such as Holbraad) focus on state capacity,
whereas neo-Gramscians (such as Cox and Neufeld) privilege the posi-
tion of middle powers in the global political economy and elite com-
plicity in the neo-liberal project as explanatory variables.”41 Traditional
middle powers are economically privileged, democratic, stable, and
complacent in a globalized world. Rising middle powers, on the other
hand, are only recently flourishing economically; they are stabilizing
their political regimes and are at different stages of democratization
and in some cases such as China, far from being democratic.
As realists have long argued, countries that increase their economic
and military capabilities beyond those of weak powers find their place
in the international system as middle powers to help major powers
maintain the international regime that they have established.42 Middle
powers have similar vested interests in the system to the great global
powers, thus their compliance in the international regime is rational.
Consequently, middle powers are internationalists and active in inter-
national organizations, seeking to further the hegemonic political and
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economic agenda. Although these characteristics apply to the recent
phenomenon of rising middle powers, there are important differences
between the new and old middle powers.
Jordaan finds that rising powers are more reform-oriented as they
are newcomers to a system of states and they are structurally differ-
ent (i.e. less affluent or democratic) than other middle powers.43
Moreover, these rising countries retain “non-structural forms of power
and influence associated with the energetic and creative use of their
diplomatic talents.”44 Thus, they combine “hard power” and “soft
power” in a way that lets them revise their position in the system to
become regional and global players. Do rising powers challenge the system
amicably through norm contestation, or do they follow established
norms?
Building on the Turkish case, I argue that rising middle powers use
soft power, such as a Third World solidarity discourse or amicable calls
for norm revision as well as mediation attempts, to not to be compelled
to use force to accomplish their revisionist goals. As previously men-
tioned, in 2010, Turkey pursued a mediator role along with another
rising power, Brazil, to strike a deal between the West and Iran, and
pushed the UN for a peaceful resolution of the Iran issue. This was
quite the impossible task for both countries involved, and it conse-
quently failed. However, the effort raised eyebrows in the American
media, which questioned why these two allies of the West would
seemingly try to ally with Iran, a longtime rogue state.
Columnist Thomas Friedman went so far as to describe the agree-
ment brokered by Brazil and Turkey “as ugly as it gets” in a New York
Times editorial piece.45 More interestingly, Friedman mocked the two
states for trying to “play at the big power table,” which was indeed
what Brazil and Turkey were doing, although they did not see anything
wrong with that. It is unlikely that they perceived this mediation effort
as “challenging” the West. On the contrary, they were attempting to
demonstrate to the West their usefulness and how their surging soft
power could be of practical use in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Shortly thereafter, the Obama administration not only declined the bro-
kering efforts of Brazil and Turkey, but further strengthened sanctions
against Iran.
The efforts of these two rising powers to revise their passive position
in the UN system did not end well; however, this incident is quite
remarkable in showing that rising powers follow similar strategies to
work within the norms of the established global governance and at
times can cooperate to pursue their strategic interests. Indeed, when
necessary, they may try to reform the rules of the international regimes
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established by great powers. In fact, according to Jordaan, rising
middle powers “do occasionally challenge hegemonic rudiments,
thereby strengthening ties with the minnows in their geographic
immediacy and in South-dominated international organizations.”46
Nevertheless, the rising powers mostly stay within the dictates of the
existing regime, hence they are more norm-abiding than norm-breaking.
As the Turkish case demonstrates, international interventions, parti-
cularly peace operations, are good examples of why and how even UN
missions can be strategically used to enhance a country’s position in
the international system vis-à-vis other middle powers and regional
actors. As Kai Michael Kenkel posits, “[d]edication to multilateral
institutions is the primary hallmark of middle power foreign policy,”47
and “peace operations provide an important profile enhancement tool
for emerging powers.”48
Rising middle powers are willing to use this foreign policy instru-
ment resourcefully more often than traditional middle powers, which
rather selectively utilize these channels to maintain the existing order—
mostly a traditional Cold War function of middle powers. Since the
post-Cold War surge in rising power aspirations, the goal of these
countries is not only to maintain the existing order, but also to
enhance their own rising position in the system. Thus, peacekeeping is
a power-enhancing venue for their long-term political ambitions. For
regionally strong power holders like emerging powers, peace operations
provide a bridge to obtaining global power and declaring it to great
powers that may or may not be assigning a middle power role to them.
This is rather obvious in the Turkish political elite’s psyche, as can be
seen in Davutoğlu’s writings.
Moreover, peacekeeping operations serve as a way to launch bilat-
eral relations with countries that would otherwise be unlikely or too
costly. Middle powers that possess the economic capabilities and poli-
tical willingness to reach out to international organizations and take
more active part in multilateral endeavors such as peacekeeping mis-
sions do so under strategic calculations. The objective is to enhance
national interests in a globalized world where relations no longer
revolve around bilateral alliances. Thus, several instruments are avail-
able to the middle power that envisions itself as a rising power. Peace
operations are among those instruments, and a rather less politically
costly option compared with mediation attempts that may not be
supported by major powers.
As Wiharta et al. put it, “to a large extent, the current approach and
agenda of contemporary peace operations have been shaped by the
political support, funding and the normative priorities of the Global
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North, while being largely implemented by the Global South.”49
Hence the economic burden of peace operations in the UN is mostly
taken on by great powers50 and human costs are not particularly high
in most missions. States like Turkey may choose not to get involved in
hot conflict zones and limit their troops to a mere handful, hence
making these missions even less costly. Moreover, peacekeeping
becomes less costly for rising powers as their principle of action is “to
focus on integrated development and peacebuilding over peace enfor-
cement; and engagement based on cultural affinity and close contact
with the host country population.”51 Despite the rather low costs,
peace operations help “assert the position of regional leader as well as
it serves international objectives, including the aspiration to become a
permanent member of the UN Security Council” and rising powers
“demonstrate a capacity to play with great powers.”52
While scholars expect to see a clash between rising powers and great
powers, as the Turkish case demonstrates, such a clash is the exception
rather than the rule. Despite similarities that make it possible to cate-
gorize countries under the rising power banner, and while some rising
powers cooperate at times as in the example of Turkey and Brazil,
these countries do not form a cooperative effort to challenge any
established rules and norms in international organizations. If anything,
as Turkey did in the case of Syrian civil conflict, they ask the Western
countries to more effectively enforce the rules that they themselves
established. Rising powers often object to the use of force, and Brazil
has asked to supplement R2P with RwP, and even abstained from the
voting on resolution that called for the Libya intervention. However,
that too seems to be more an exception than the norm. In fact, “many
have assumed that rising powers will form a bloc of ‘norm breakers’
contesting prevailing norms and setting alternate ones. However, when
the BRICS countries … gathered in Rio de Janeiro in June 2010 to
develop ‘perspectives from the South’ as part of the UN’s New Hor-
izon consultation process, the outcomes were remarkably close to
mainstream policies.”53
Overall, rising powers appear to be norm takers as opposed to norm
makers or breakers. In the long term, this may change, and rising
powers may contest norms, as Turkey and Brazil exceptionally tried to
do; however, in the short term, despite their inflammatory rhetoric,
rising powers do not behave so differently from traditional middle
powers that follow existing rules and practices. As Tardy aptly puts it,
“the peacekeeping-peacebuilding field may not be worth the fight
that normative divergences can entail.”54
Multilateral interventions as a power-enhancing instrument 141
Conclusion
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government and Ahmet Davu-
toğlu’s leadership has become more proactive in discourse and action
since 2002. It is debatable whether the policies bore success, but there is
little question about Turkey’s aspirations to become a rising power.
Although this was the goal of the previous few governments, it was
only after the 2001 economic crisis that both domestic and interna-
tional factors aligned to the advantage of the country, inspiring the
political elite to challenge Turkey’s weak/middle power status in the
international system. As the economy thrived and the new business
elite pushed the political elite to search for new export markets, it
became more important to revise Turkey’s position in its periphery and
with regard to the center. Ahmet Davutoğlu, an academic and the
architect of this proactive foreign policy, envisioned changing Turkey’s
position as that of a bridge country (which also meant liminal, brid-
ging the periphery to the center but still remaining as a peripheral
country)55 trying to passively exist under the Western strategic
security umbrella (NATO) and the political and economic hegemony
of the West (European Union), not only into that of a “center
country” but also a “global player” that actively pursues its national
interests.56
At that juncture, enhancing bilateral relations and implementing “zero
problems with the neighbors” policy with Turkey’s immediate periph-
ery became the first strategy Davutoğlu followed. Multilateralism and
active participation in international organizations followed as a sec-
ondary strategy. When the primary policy failed as relations with Iran,
Israel, and Syria soured, multilateralism became the primary objective.
The United Nations has long attracted Davutoğlu’s attention as a
world organization, and he supported an intense campaign first for the
2009–2010 UNSC non-permanent seat and then for a seat in 2015–2016.
To achieve his goal, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan paid frequent visits to
African countries, sent police and troops to African peace operations,
and provided further assistance to missions such as that deployed by the
ERU to the Central African Republic. In fact, Erdoğan has recently
been declared “the hero of Somalia” by the former Somalian special
envoy to the United States, Ambassador Abukar Arman, in an analysis
of Erdoğan’s recent visit to several African countries including Soma-
lia.57 In reality, Turkey’s military presence inUNpeacekeeping, especially
in Africa, remained mostly token contributions, meaning the manpower
sent to missions was negligible but the presence of the country in
several missions stood out.58 The perception that Turkey has become a
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regional power and a global player that can and will have a say in
world affairs is readily constructed in the Middle East and Africa.59
Turkey’s path from the periphery to the center is not unique and the
implications for other rising powers are manifold. Weak/middle powers
like Turkey and Brazil that recover from political and economic
instability seek to increase their leverage in the international system
through various means such as humanitarian aid, mediation, and
peace operations. Along with other rising powers such as Brazil,
Turkey prioritized all three of these strategies in its foreign policy-
making. Turkey and Brazil sought to mediate various Middle Eastern
conflicts and Brazil has become more active in conflicts in its periph-
ery. In contrast with traditional middle powers, countries like Turkey
and Brazil are still politically and economically developing; however,
they aspire to become rising middle powers using multilateralism and
international interventions strategically.
While both Brazil and Turkey strictly followed the norm of non-
intervention until the last decade, a more proactive foreign policy
initiative meant playing active roles in particularly regional peace
operations as well as missions further afield. While traditional middle
powers such as Canada subscribe to a notion of “good global citizen-
ship,” rising powers such as Brazil and Turkey employ peace opera-
tions as strategic tools to increase their influence in the international
system. Despite Brazil and Turkey’s outspoken objections to imple-
mentation of certain norms such as the R2P in certain instances such
as Libya or Syria interventions, and their calls for revisions of norms
and their practices, both rising countries have remained within the
established normative frameworks in peacekeeping and other domains
of global governance, that is mediation and humanitarian aid. This is
no coincidence, as rising powers, despite all their soft power and
ambition to rise from the periphery to the center, strategically work
within the established system and rarely cooperate with one another
long enough to evolve into norm breakers, shapers or makers.
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17 Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-
Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era,” Turkish
Studies 10, no. 1 (2009): 7–24.
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Genel Kurulunda uluslararası topluma birlik ve beraberlik içinde hareket
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